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INTRODUCTION 
In its brief, Counterclaim Defendant and Appellee High-Country Estates 
Homeowners Association ("the Association") desperately attempts to explain why the 
Well Lease does not or cannot mean what it plainly says, despite the undeniable fact that 
its validity has been affirmed by the trial court, this Court and the Utah Supreme Court. 
The trial court, after hearing all of the evidence presented at trial and carefully 
considering the Association's arguments, correctly concluded that the Well Lease was 
neither unconscionable nor violative of any public policy. The trial court's decision is 
supported by overwhelming evidence and is therefore not erroneous. This Court should 
accordingly preclude the Association from continuing to deprive the Dansies of their 
right to water as explicitly set forth in the Well Lease. 
Likewise, the trial court acted well within its discretion in awarding the Dansies 
judgment in the amount of $16,334.99 for improvements made to the Association's 
Water System. This judgment was based on sound evidence and authority that 
unequivocally demonstrates its reasonableness. 
Unfortunately, however, the trial court's Order is not free of error, as it 
erroneously concluded that the Well Lease requires the Dansies to obtain water only upon 
payment of their pro rata transportation fee, despite the undeniable fact that the Well 
Lease expressly provides otherwise. This conclusion is neither supported nor justified by 
the Orders of the Public Service Commission and the Utah Supreme Court. Quite to the 
contrary, it is undisputed that the Water System was decertified as a public utility in 
1996, rendering any Public Service Commission Order relied on the by trial court for its 
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Order irrelevant. Likewise, enforcing the terms of the Well Lease will not subject the 
Water System to the jurisdiction of the Public Service Commission, as such enforcement 
would simply add the Dansies to the list of users and nonmembers pursuant to specific 
contracts, a category of users recognized by the Public Service Commission as not 
violative of any exemption status. 
Because the trial court erred in holding that, as a prerequisite to obtaining water 
pursuant to the specific terms of the Well Lease, the Dansies must first pay their pro rata 
share of the transportation costs, the Association breached the Well Lease by severing the 
two Water Systems. The Association does not dispute that it severed the Water System. 
Rather, it would have this Court believe that its actions resulted in no damages to the 
Dansies. Such argument belies credulity. Certainly severing the Water System caused 
damages to the Dansies. The Association simply disputes the amount of damages 
sustained, and the Dansies' actions in response. However, the Association's argument is 
without merit, as there is ample evidence in the record of the Dansies' damages resulting 
from the Association's actions in severing the Water System. Likewise, contrary to the 
Association's argument, such damages were certainly foreseeable at the time the Well 
Lease was executed and the Dansies' actions in constructing a temporary water system 
satisfied their duty to mitigate. The Association's arguments are therefore not well taken. 
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ARGUMENT 
I. THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY DETERMINED THAT THE WELL 
LEASE IS NEITHER UNCONSCIONABLE NOR VIOLATIVE OF ANY 
PUBLIC POLICY. 
In its January 5, 2006 Order, the trial court correctly concluded that "[t]he Well 
Lease is not void as against public policy. Specifically, the Well Lease is not void based 
on Utah Code Ann. §§54-3-8(1) and 54-3-1, the PSC's 1986 Order, or the 
unconscionability doctrine." R. at 001766. The Association's arguments to the contrary 
are without merit. 
Utah law provides parties with substantial latitude to contract freely: 
With a few exceptions, it is still axiomatic in contract law that 
"persons dealing at arms' length are entitled to contract on 
their own terms without the intervention of the Courts for the 
purpose of relieving one side or the other from the effects of a 
bad bargain. Parties 'should be permitted to enter into 
contracts that actually may be unreasonable or which may 
lead to hardship on one side.' 'Although courts will not be 
parties to enforcing fragrantly unjust agreements, it is not for 
the courts to assume the paternalistic role of declaring that 
one who has freely bound himself not perform because the 
bargain is not favorable. 
Bekins Bar VRanch v. Huth, 664 P.2d 455, 459 (Utah 1983) (internal citations omitted). 
In order for a contract to be voided as unconscionable, a court must find that "no decent, 
fair-minded person would view the ensuing results without being possessed of a profound 
sense of injustice." Resource Management Co. v. Westin Ranch & Livestock Co., Inc., 
706 P.2d 1028, 1041 (Utah 1985). Likewise, for a contract provision to be considered 
unenforceable or void as against public policy expressed in a statutory provision, a court 
"must determine (1) what the terms of the contract are; (2) what the statute prohibits; and 
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(3) whether the statute or public policy demands that the contract be deemed 
unenforceable." Peterson v. Sunrider Corp., 2002 UT 43, ^ f 27. 
The Association contends that the trial court erred, and that the Well Lease is void 
because it is unconscionable and violates the public policy of certain utility regulations 
set forth in Utah Code Ann. Title 54, Article XI of the Utah Constitution, and the 1986 
Order of the Public Service Commission ("1986 Order"). Each argument lacks merit. As 
set forth below, the trial court correctly concluded that (1) the evidence presented at trial 
demonstrated that the Well Lease was reasonable, provided substantial benefits to the 
Association and is therefore not unconscionable; (2) the Water System is not a public 
utility and the provisions of Title 54 are therefore inapplicable; and (3) the PSC had no 
jurisdiction to determine the validity of the Well Lease and its findings. Furthermore, 
this Court has already determined that the Well Lease does not violate public policy. 
Accordingly, the trial court's decision upholding the validity of the Well Lease should be 
affirmed. 
A, The Well Lease Is Not Unconscionable. 
In a vain attempt to avoid its obligations under the Well Lease, the Association 
argues that the trial court erred in failing to conclude that the terms of the Well Lease are 
unconscionable. For example, the Association argues that it did not need the water from 
Dansie Well No. 1, that the Dansies' ten year obligation to lease the well expired long 
ago, that the value of the Well Lease to the Dansies was at least $263,607.00, while the 
value to the Association customers was $7,000.00, and that the Well Lease requires a 
perpetual obligation for subsidized water. Br. of Appellee at p. 33. Thus, the Association 
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argues that these terms represent such "a gross imbalance in the obligations and rights 
under the Lease, it is unconscionable and should be invalidated " Id 1 he Association's 
arguments are not well taken and do not satisfy the strict standards for establishing 
unconscionability. As stated by the Utah Supreme Court: 
The determination of whether a contract is unconscionable is 
usually made with respect to the conditions that existed at the 
time the contract was made, and without regard for the 
parties' subsequent conduct and dealings. . . . Furthermore, 
analysis of the relevant interests to be evaluated may be 
promoted by distinguishing between substantive 
considerations, which focus on the terms of the contract and 
procedural considerations, which refer to the relative 
positions of the parties and circumstances surrounding the 
execution of the contract. 
Bekins, et al v Huth, et al, 644 P.2d 455, 461. The Bekins Court set forth the factors 
that bear on unconscionability: 
(1) the use of printed form or boilerplate contracts drawn 
skillfully by the party in the strongest economic position, ... 
(2) excessive price or interest; (3) phrasing clauses in 
language that is incomprehensible to a layman or that divert 
his attention from the problems raised by them or the rights 
given up through them, (4) an overall imbalance in the 
obligations and rights imposed by the bargain, (5) 
exploitation of the underprivileged, unsophisticated, 
uneducated and the illiterate, ... (6) contract terms so one-
sided as to oppress or unfairly surprise an innocent party, ... 
and (7) lack of opportunity for meaningful negotiation. 
Id at 461-462. 
The record fails to contain evidence sufficient to support these criteria. As set 
forth in the testimony of Rodney Dansie at trial, when the Well Lease was executed in 
1977, the Dansie Well offered the only substantial and reliable water source available to 
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the Association. The Dansies and the Well Lease thereafter provided that reasonable and 
reliable source of water for the Association until the Association chose to remove itself 
from the Dansie Well Tr. at 100:12-:24 (Rodney Dansie). Further, the Association spent 
thousands of dollars to drill its own alternate well and rework that well in efforts to make 
the water supply from that well viable and sufficient for the Association's needs. Tr. at 
1012:18-015:22, 1016:17-1024:19 & Trial Exs. 259 & 243. The Well Lease saved the 
Association from that substantial expense until the Association voluntarily chose to incur 
it. 
Likewise, Rodney Dansie and other homeowners testified that the Dansies made 
available a Dansie water tank to supplement water storage for the Association's system 
and that the Dansies invested tens of thousands of dollars of their own money to repair 
and upgrade the Association's water system during the term of the Well Lease. Tr. at 
121:14-18 & 209:20-210:16 (Rodney Dansie); 430:15-433:25 (Tyler); Trial Exs. 5 & 
176; 479:14-24 (Richard Dansie). While the benefits of the Well Lease became less 
visible to the Association in later years, and as other sources of water became more 
available to the Association, the evidence demonstrates that the benefits of the Well 
Lease in its early years were essential to the Association. Indeed, for many years the 
members of the Association enjoyed the benefits of the Well Lease without complaint or 
objection. The record accordingly demonstrates no shocking unfairness that would 
support any basis for invalidating the Well Lease as unconscionable.1 
1
 Jessie Dansie apparently anticipated the possibility that the operators of the Water 
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After hearing the evidence and weighing the credibility of the witnesses, the trial 
court thus correctly determined that: 
There were insufficient facts established at the evidentiary 
hearing for the Court to provide a meaningful review of the 
unconscionability of the Well Lease. For example, the Court 
must view the conditions that existed at the time the Well 
Lease was executed without regard for the parties' subsequent 
conduct and dealings. Few facts were established about the 
conditions that existed at the time the Well Lease was 
executed. Furthermore, there were few facts established 
regarding the procedural considerations of the Well Lease, 
meaning the relative positions of the parties and the 
circumstances surrounding the execution of the contract. The 
sliding scale consideration of unconscionability requires this 
Court to have more facts to fully consider the Association's 
claim. 
R. at 1897. Based on the foregoing, the trial court's decision upholding the validity of 
the Well Lease should be affirmed. 
B. The Well Lease Does Not Violate The Public Policy In The Utah 
Statutes or Constitution. 
As correctly determined by the trial court, there is no evidence that any of the 
terms of the Well Lease violate any statutory provisions or that the public policy would 
demand that such provisions be unenforceable. 
Even though the Water System is no longer public, the Association argues that 
section 54-3-1 of the Utah Code, which requires public utilities to set "just and 
System might establish an alternate supply of water, would sever the lines between the 
Dansie well and the water system, and the line to the Dansie properties, leaving the 
Dansie family without water, as occurred in this case. To prevent his family from being 
left without water, Jessie Dansie provided in the Well Lease that water rights to the 
Dansie family would continue even if from another water source. The fact that the 
Association has developed an alternate source of water is therefore not a basis for 
depriving the Dansies of their contractual rights. 
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reasonable" charges and fees for its produces and commodities renders the Well Lease 
provision entitling the Dansies to 12 million gallons of water per year unenforceable. 
The Association further contends that section 54-3-8(1), which prohibits public utilities 
from granting "any preference or advantage to any person," "results in a preference to the 
Dansies with concomitant disadvantage to the Association's rate payers." Br. of 
Appellee at p. 31. The Association's reliance on Title 54 is misplaced. 
First, Utah Code Ann. § 54-2-l(15)(a) defines a public utility as any "water 
corporation" that delivers to "the public generally" or to a corporation that is a public 
utility. The Dansies are neither the general public nor a public utility. Rather, the Water 
System ceased to be a public utility in 1996. (Trial Ex. 44) . At that time, the PSC and 
the statutes governing the conduct of public utilities ceased to have any jurisdiction over 
the Association and its Water System. While the orders of the PSC under Title 54 may 
have insulated the Association from the requirements of the Well Lease during the period 
that the Association's Water System was a regulated public utility, that protection ceased 
when the Water System ceased to be a public utility. Accordingly, a private contract 
between the Dansies and the Association allowing the Dansies to transport water through 
the Water System would not change the Association's exempt status. 
The Association also makes a "catch 22" argument by contending that "if the 
Association's Water System serves Dansie customers, it necessarily loses its public 
The February 5, 1996 Order, concludes that the water system was "organized as a non-
profit, mutual water company" that "serves some non-members under contract, it does 
not offer service to the public at large" and therefore decertified the Association's water 
system. R. 001119-1121. 
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utility status." Br. of Appellee at 31. This argument likewise misses the point. Utah 
regulates those public utilities that afford services to the public generally. Companies 
that offer their services only to their members or owners are not treated as public utilities, 
even if they also provide services on a limited basis under private contracts to other 
parties. The Association primarily provides water to its members. Prior to and since 
1996, however, the Association has provided water to other individuals under contract, 
including residents of adjacent subdivisions and the Bureau of Land Management. The 
Well Lease is simply one more private contractual relationship under which the 
Association is obligated to transport water belonging to the Dansies. 
Correctly applying this analysis, the trial court concluded, "[cjlearly Title 54 does 
not apply in this case and the terms of the Well Lease are not prohibited by Title 54. 
Although the water system operated as a public utility for a short time, for over twenty 
plus years the water system has operated as a private water system that has not served the 
public at large. Rather, the Association's water system is limited to its members and the 
few non-members under contract." R. at 1892. 
The trial court also correctly held that the public policy embodied in Title 54 could 
not render the Well Lease invalid, reasoning, "[w]hen the Well Lease was first executed, 
the Dansie's well was the only reliable water source available to the Association. The 
two private parties negotiated the Well Lease at arms length. The Court would be 
assuming a paternalistic role by declaring the Well Lease void as a matter of public 
policy embodied in Title 54. Just because the Association previously contracted to give 
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more than it now desires to give in the Well Lease does not make the Well Lease void as 
a matter of public policy." R. at 1893. 
Article XI, section 5(b) of the Utah Constitution likewise has no application. That 
section confers upon municipalities the power "[t]o furnish all local public services, to 
purchase, hire, construct, own, maintain and operate, or lease public utilities local in 
extent and use. . ." The Association's contention that the Well Lease ufacially frustrates" 
the policy of safe and efficient management of water resources because the Association 
"wants to turn its Water System over to a governmental entity, but cannot do so if the 
Well Lease is binding," misses the mark. Br. of Appellee at p. 32. As the trial court 
correctly concluded, "The Association does not show that private water systems are 
prohibited by the Utah Constitution or statute, therefore, this argument is unsupported 
and has no merit." R. at 1892, n.L 
C. The Findings Of The PSC Are Not Relevant To The Enforceability Of 
The Well Lease, 
The Association's reliance on the 1986 PSC Order for its argument that that the 
Well Lease violates public policy is likewise misplaced. In the 1986 Order in question, 
the PSC purported to find the Well Lease unenforceable and against public policy. The 
Association's argument, however, ignores the limited jurisdiction of the PSC and the 
specific ruling of the Utah Supreme Court in this litigation. As the trial court correctly 
recognized, "[t]he Utah Supreme Court made it clear that the PSC had authority to 
determine what contractual expenses should or should not be passed on to rate payers, 
but could not determine the validity or invalidity of contracts, like the Well Lease. The 
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findings of the PSC with respect to expenses that may be passed on to the class of 
ratepayers that the PSC is charged with protecting operate in a wholly different 
environment than the free contractual arena that exists outside the regulation of public 
utilities.5' R. at 1894. 
As previously and conclusively determined by the Utah Supreme Court, the UPSC 
did not have jurisdiction to invalidate the 1977 Well Lease Agreement as long as that 
agreement did not impact the rates paid by the Homeowners Association" and "ordinary 
contracts unrelated to [its rate making authority] are outside of the purview of the PSC 
jurisdiction;' 901 P.2d 1017, 1023 (Utah 1996). 
The Utah Supreme Court acknowledged that the PSC had jurisdiction, in the 
context of setting rates for public utilities, to determine what contractual expenses should 
or should not be passed on to rate payers. The Supreme Court made clear, however, that 
the PSC could not reach beyond its rate-making function to determine the validity or 
invalidity of contracts. Public utilities have monopoly powers to provide services or 
goods to the public. In return, those public utilities are subjected to regulation of the 
services and charges they may impose by the PSC in order to prevent abuses of the 
monopoly power granted to those utilities. Outside the context of the utilities, however, 
the State does not confer such monopoly powers and the presumption is that freedom of 
contract will govern the relationship of the parties. Thus, the finding of the PSC with 
respect to expenses that may be passed on to the class of rate payers that the PSC is 
charged with protecting operate in a wholly different environment than the free 
contractual arena that exists outside the regulation of public utilities. 
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After hearing and considering all of the evidence presented at trial, the trial court 
thus correctly determined that, "the Well Lease involved private parties dealing at arms 
length regarding a private water system. The Court will not impose the PSC's policy that 
rates by nondiscriminatory on private parties contracting regarding a private water 
system." R. at 1895. 
D. This Court Has Already Declined To Find That The Well Lease 
Violates Public Policy. 
This Court addressed the issue of the enforceability of the Well Lease on grounds 
of public policy in its 1996 decision. See Hi-Country Estates v. Bagley & Co., 928 P.2d 
1047 (Utah App. 1996). The Association's argument to the contrary is therefore without 
merit. The procedural context by which this issue reached this Court is significant to 
fully appreciate this Court's comments. In the early 1990s, the trial court found the Well 
Lease to be unenforceable based on the PSC's ruling to that effect. That decision was 
appealed to this Court, which affirmed the trial court's decision. See Hi-Country Estates 
v. Bagley & Co., 863 P.2d 1 (Utah App. 1993). That decision, was, in turn, appealed to 
the Utah Supreme Court, which held that the PSC had no jurisdiction to determine the 
enforceability of the Well Lease, and the Supreme Court then remanded the case back to 
this Court. See Hi-Country Estates v. Bagley & Co., 901 P.2d 1017, 1023 (Utah 1996). 
This Court then addressed the question of whether the public policy made the 
Well Lease unenforceable in the context of a specific ruling on that issue by the Utah 
Supreme Court. Quite to the contrary of the Association's contention, the question of 
whether the Well Lease was valid under public policy was thus squarely before this 
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Court, which had before it a full record, including the Well Lease and the findings of the 
PSC. In that context, this Court noted that it could make "a legal determination, 
independent of the PSC's conclusions, that the terms of the agreement are unreasonable 
as applied to the Homeowners Association, and refuse to enforce the agreement on 
grounds of public policy." Hi-Country Estates v. Bagley & Co., 928 P.2d 1047, 1052 
(Utah Ct App. 1996). This Court, however, declined to do so, and likewise declined to 
remand this issue to the trial court for any further determination. Id. This Court's ruling 
accordingly constitutes a final finding that the Well Lease does not violate public policy. 
E. The Well Lease Is Binding On The Association As An Assign Or 
Sucesssor. 
Finally, the Association argues that it is not bound by the terms of the Well Lease 
because it is not a "successor or assign" to the Well Lease. Br. of Appellee at pp. 29-30. 
The Association, however, never raised this issue below, and therefore failed to preserve 
the issue for appeal. Accordingly, the Association has waived this argument, and this 
Court should refuse to hear the Association's argument on this point: 
In order to preserve an issue for appeal, the issue must be 
presented to the trial court in such a way that the trial court 
has an opportunity to rule on that issue. This requirement 
puts the trial judge on notice of the asserted error and allows 
for correction at that time in the course of the proceeding. 
For a trial court to be afforded an opportunity to correct the 
error (1) the issue must be raised in a timely fashion, (2) the 
issue must be specifically raised, and (3) the challenging 
party must introduce supporting evidence or relevant legal 
authority. Issues that are not raised at trial are usually 
deemed waived. 
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438 Main Street v. Easy Heat, Inc., 2004 UT 72, t 51, 99 P.3d 801 (emphasis added) 
(internal quotations and citations omitted). See also Strawberry Elec. Service Dist v. 
Spanish Fork City, 918 P.2d 870, 880 (Utah 1996) (declining to address argument 
because it was raised for first time on appeal); Bangerter v. Poulton, 663 P.2d 100, 102 
("It is axiomatic that defenses and claims not raised by the parties in the trial cannot be 
considered for the first time on appeal."). The Association never made any argument, or 
presented any factual evidence or legal authority at the trial court that it was not a 
successor or assign to the Well Lease, and that it should therefore not be bound by its 
terms. Likewise, the Association has provided this Court with no circumstances, let 
alone exceptional circumstances, that would justify the Association's failure to raise this 
issue below. Therefore, this Court should disregard the Association's argument about 
whether it was a successor or assign. 
Even if this Court were to hear the Association's argument, despite their failure to 
raise the issue in the trial court, the Association's argument is nonetheless without merit. 
J
 Tellingly, this issue was not even included in the parties' stipulation of the remaining 
issues for trial. Indeed, as the Association has recognized in its brief, the parties 
stipulated to what issues would be addressed at trial, including: (1) whether the Well 
Lease Agreement is void as against public policy; (2) whether the Dansies agreed to the 
chlorination, pumping, testing and transportation costs of transporting their water through 
the Associations' water system; (3) if the Dansies did agree, what are the costs of 
transporting the water; and (4) what damages did the Dansies sustain because the 
Association refused to transport the water. R. 1555-54. Conspicuously absent from this 
list is any mention of whether Association is an "assign" or "successor" and whether it 
should be bound by the Well Lease if it is not. Certainly the questions of whether the 
Well Lease is void as unconscionable or against public policy are very different from the 
question of whether the Association is not bound by the Well Lease because it is not a 
successor or assign. 
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The Well Lease is binding on Bagley's "successors or assigns," and the Association 
therefore argues that because it did not succeed to Bagley's interest through "inheritance, 
assignment or the like," the Association is not subject to the Well Lease. Br. of Appellee 
at pp. 29-30. The Association's sole legal authority for this argument derives from two 
cases from this Court, both of which actually contradict the Association's argument. For 
example, in Oquirrh Associates v. First National Leasing Co., 888 P.2d 659, 661 (Utah 
Ct. App. 1994), the plaintiff sold a piece of real property to the defendants on an 
installment contract. Thereafter, the defendants assigned their interest in the property to a 
third party by quitclaim deed. After the defendants defaulted on the monthly payments, 
the plaintiff foreclosed on the property, obtained a judgment, and sold the property to 
itself at a sheriffs sale. Id. After failing to collect on the judgment from the defendants, 
the plaintiff attempted to collect from the third party, arguing that by accepting the 
quitclaim deed from the defendants, the third party assumed the defendants' obligations a 
"successor" under the contract. Id. at 663. 
This Court held that the third party was not liable for the defendants' obligations 
to the plaintiff, finding that while the third party "became a successor to the [defendants'] 
property interest"' they were not successors to the contract between the [defendants| and 
[plaintiff]. Id. (emphasis added). However, this Court noted that a quitclaim deed is a 
deed of conveyance that passes whatever title, interest or claim that the grantor has in the 
property. Id. Therefore, upon accepting the deed, the third party "obtained the 
[defendants'] interest in the property subject to any existing encumbrances against that 
interest:' Id. (emphasis added). Similarly in West v. Case, 2006 UT App. 325, \ 21, 142 
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P.3d 576, this Court found that a party not a signatory to a real estate purchase contract 
was not a successor or assign to the contract, but still had an in rem obligation to transfer 
the property to the purchasers upon their fulfilling of their obligations under the contract. 
These cases therefore demonstrate that although a successor in title to property may not 
be a successor to a previous contract, the successor in title still takes the property subject 
to all existing encumbrances on the land. 
Here, the Association took title to the Water System subject to the Well Lease. In 
earlier litigation, this Court affirmed the trial court's decision to quite title to the Water 
System in favor of the Association based on a series of quitclaim deeds granting the 
parties' respective interests in the water system to the Association. See Hi-County 
Estates v. Bagley, 863 P.2d 1, 4-5 (Utah Ct. App. 1993). Upon receiving the property, 
the Association therefore took whatever interest in the property the grantors had, "subject 
to any existing encumbrances." See Oquirrh, 888 P.2d at 663. The Association thus 
cannot receive by quitclaim deed a greater interest than what was held by the grantor. 
See id. As discussed herein, this Court has declared the Well Lease to be a valid 
encumbrance on the Water System. Because the Water System was encumbered by the 
Well Lease at the time the Association took title to the property by way of quitclaim 
deed, the Association took the Water System subject to the Well Lease. Accordingly, the 
Associations' argument that it is not subject to the lease because it is not a "successor or 
assign" is without merit. 
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II. THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION IN 
AWARDING THE DANSIES $16,33499 FOR IMPROVEMENTS TO THE 
WATER SYSTEM, 
The Association contends that the trial court's reliance on the PSC finding for its 
award of $16,334.99 to the Dansies for improvements to the Water System is problematic 
because "it is not certain whether the improvements were for the period 1981-1985 and 
whether Foothills recovered some or all of the improvements through water rates," Br. of 
Appellee at 35. The Association is mistaken, as the evidence clearly demonstrates thai 
the trial court acted well within its discretion awarding the Dansies this amount. As 
explained by the trial court in its January 5, 2006 Order, "[t]he findings of the Public 
Service Commission in its Final Report and Order dated March 17, 1986, constitute the 
only credible evidence before the Court regarding the value of improvements to the 
Water System between 1981 and 1985." R. at 001756. Accordingly, the trial court 
concluded that "Foothills is entitled to recover the sum of $16,334.99 as reimbursement 
for improvements to the Water System between 1981 and 1985." Id, at p 5-6. At the 
hearing on this matter, the trial court further explained as follows: 
The Court has carefully considered the question [of the value 
of the improvements between 1981-1985], and it has been 
discussed at length over a long, long period of tine involving 
a number of settings. And the Court finds that the only 
credible evidence on which the Court can make a decision on 
the value of the improvements, the only credible admissible 
evidence on that issue, is the finding of the Public Service 
Commission. And it provides the Court with the best 
indication of the value of those improvements on what review 
and consideration the Public Service Commission made on 
that issue. 
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R. at 001866, pp. 51-52 (emphasis added). Such a finding was certainly within the trial's 
court discretion and the trial court's award of $16,334.99 in favor of the Dansies should 
accordingly be affirmed. See Lysenco v. Sawaya, 1999 UT App. 31 ,^6 , 973 P.2d 445 
("We review the trial court's decision to award damages under a standard which gives the 
court considerable discretion, and will not disturb its ruling absent an abuse of discretion. 
Furthermore, because the adequacy of a damage award is a factual question, we will not 
reverse the trial court's findings unless they are clearly erroneous.") (emphasis added) 
(internal citations omitted). 
III. THE ASSOCIATION'S RELIANCE ON THE PSC AND THE UTAH 
SUPREME COURT FOR ITS ARGUMENT THAT THE WELL LEASE 
REQUIRES THE DANSIES TO PAY THEIR PRO RATA 
TRANSPORTATION COSTS IS MISPLACED. 
The Association's argument that requiring its members to provide the Dansies 
with the water and hook-ups as provided in the Well Lease would violate the ruling of the 
PSC is irrelevant, as the PSC no longer has jurisdiction over the Water System. Indeed, 
the Association does not dispute that because the PSC divested itself of jurisdiction over 
the Water System in 1996, its 1986 Order is no longer binding or enforceable on the 
water system. Likewise, the Association does not dispute that because the PSC's 1986 
Order was the only thing that limited how the courts of Utah have enforced the Well 
Lease, and because the 1986 Order is no longer binding, the Well Lease must be enforced 
in its entirety. Rather, the Association simply suggests that because of the costs involved 
in providing the water and hook-ups, as provided in the Well Lease, those terms should 
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not be enforced. This argument misses the mark, and the trial court's Order should 
accordingly be reversed. 
The Association also mischaracterizes the Utah Supreme Court's decision in Hi-
Country II, 901 P.2d at 1023, by stating that "[t]he Supreme Court further held that the 
PSC could not invalidate the Well Lease 'as long as that agreement did not impact the 
rates paid by the Homeowners Association.'" Br. of Appellee at 35 (quoting Hi-Country 
Estates v Bagley & Co., 901 P.2d at 1023). In truth, the Utah Supreme Court stated: 
In any event, the PSC did not have jurisdiction to invalidate 
the 1977 well lease agreement as long as that agreement did 
not impact the rates paid by the Homeowners Association. 
Although the PSC has power to construe contracts affecting 
mattes within its jurisdiction such as rate-making, ordinary 
contracts unrelated to such matters are outside the purview of 
PSC jurisdiction. 
Hi-Country Estates v. Bagley & Co.} 901 P.2d at 1023 (emphasis added). Viewed in the 
appropriate context, it is clear that the Utah Supreme Court's language does not never 
imposed any condition whatsoever on the validity or enforceability of the Well Lease.4 
The initial decision to limit the application of the Well Lease was made not by the 
trial court, but by the PSC-which has not had jurisdiction over this matter since February 
5, 1996. In contrast, both this Court and the Supreme Court'have ruled that the Well 
Lease is a valid and binding encumbrance on the water system. 
4
 For this same reason, the Association's discussion of the amount that it costs the 
Association to produce and transport water through the water system is irrelevant, as the 
PSC's Order is no longer valid or binding. 
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A. Enforcing The Terms of The Well Lease Would Not Subject The 
Water System To The Jurisdiction Of The PSC 
Reversing that portion of the trial court's order requiring the Dansie's to pay their 
pro rata share of the transportation costs would not subject the Association to PSC 
regulation as a public utility, despite the Association's argument to the contrary. As 
expressly acknowledged by the Utah Supreme Court, "[t]he PSC has only the rights and 
powers granted to it by statute." Hi-Country Estates v. Bagley & Co., 901 P.2d at 1021. 
Thus, the PSC's authority is limited to exercising jurisdiction over "public utilities," i.e., 
utilities that serve the public. Utah Code Ann. § § 54-2-l(15).5 Section 54-2-1(15) of the 
Utah Code expressly defines a "public utility" as, among other entities, a "water 
corporation ... where the service is performed for, or the commodity is delivered to, the 
5
 The Association cites to section 24-2-1 (26) & (27) of the Utah Code in support of its 
argument that supplying water to the Dansies in accordance with the Well Lease would 
remove it from statutory exemption. Section 24-2 of the Utah Code is nonexistent, and 
the Dansies assume that the Association is instead relying on section 54, as set forth 
above. Even with this assumption, the Association's argument must fail. Subsections 26 
of section 24-2-1 defines transportation of property to include: 
Every service in connection with or incidental to the transportation of 
property, including in particular its receipt, delivery, elevation, transfer, 
switching, carriage, ventilation, refrigeration, icing, dunnage, storage, and 
hauling, and the transmission of credit by express companies. 
Subsection 27 of section 24-2-1 likewise defines "water corporation" to include: 
Every corporation and person, their lessees, trustees, and receivers, owning, 
controlling, operating, or managing any water system for public service 
within this state. It does not include private irrigation companies engaged 
in distributing water only to their stockholders, or towns, cities, counties, 
water conservancy districts, improvement districts, or other governmental 
units created or organized under any genera or special law of this state. 
Neither of these provisions discuss whether the Association qualifies for 
exemption as a public utility. 
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public generally ..." In decertifying the Association as a public utility on Feb 5, 1996, 
the PSC specifically found that the Association (1) "is organized as a nonprofit 
corporation providing service to its members," and (2) "serves a limited number of 
nonmembers pursuant to specific contracts; however it does not offer its service to the 
public generally." R. at 001119-1120. Thus, as explained in detail in the Dansies' 
Opening Brief, the 1986 PSC Order is no longer applicable. Furthermore, adding the 
Dansies to the Association's list of water-users but enforcing the terms of the Water 
Lease would simply add the Dansies to the "limited number of nonmembers pursuant to 
specific contracts" recognized by the PSC, and therefore would not remove the 
Association from exemption of its jurisdiction. 
B. Requiring The Association To Provide Water To The Dansies In 
Accordance With The Terms Of The Well Lease Does Not Conflict 
With Section 746-331-l.C Of The Utah Administrative Code, 
The Association's reliance on section 746-331-1C of the Utah Administrative 
Code is likewise misplaced.6 This regulation was adopted on April 6, 1998. The PSC 
6
 This regulation provides as follows: 
If, on the basis of the information elicited, the Commission finds that the 
entity is an existing non-profit corporation, in good standing with the 
Division of Corporation; that the entity owns or otherwise adequately 
controls the assets necessary to furnish culinary water service to its 
members, including water sources and plants; and that voting control of the 
entity is distributed in a way that each member enjoys a complete 
commonality of interest, as a consumer, such that rate regulation would be 
superfluous, then the Commission shall issue its finding that the entity is 
exempt from Commission jurisdiction and the proceeding shall end. 
Issuance of the findings shall not preclude another Commission inquiry at a 
later time if changed circumstances or later-discovered facts warrant 
another inquiry. 
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therefore could not have relied on any portion of this regulation when it decertified the 
Association as a public utility in 1996 and therefore irrelevant to this issue. See Roark v. 
Crabtree, 893 P.2d 1058, 1061 (Utah 1995) ("It is a long-standing rule of statutory 
construction that a legislative enactment which alters the substantive law or affects vested 
rights will not be read to operate retrospectively unless the legislature has clearly 
expressed that intention."); Madsen v. Borthick, 769 P.2d 245, 253 (Utah 1988) (same). 
Moreover, even if relevant, and without citation to any support, the Association 
seems to suggest that it would lose its exemption because the Association does not own 
or control the assets necessary to furnish culinary water service to Dansies, and that the 
Dansies are neither member of the Association nor do they share a commonality of 
interest with all other customers of the system. Br. of Appellee at p. 38. These 
contentions grossly misstate the language of Regulation 746-331-1C. The Association 
owns title to the Water System, which certainly includes the "assets necessary" to furnish 
water to the Dansies. Furthermore, nowhere does Regulation 746-331-1C require the 
Association to provide service exclusively to its members. Rather, the requirement is 
simply that the voting control of the entity be "distributed in a way that each member 
enjoys a complete commonality of interest. . . ." Simply because the Dansies are not 
members of the Association does not trigger the PSC's jurisdiction. Accordingly, 
Regulation 746-331-1.C simply has no bearing on this issue. 
Utah Admin. Code. R. 746-331-l.C. 
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IV. THE RECORD DEMONSTRATES THAT THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN 
DETERMINING THAT THE ASSOCIATION DID NOT BREACH THE 
WELL LEASE AND THEREFORE SUFFERED NO DAMAGES. 
A. The Record Does Not Support The Trial Court's Conclusion That The 
Dansies Made No Offer To Pay Transportation Costs. 
The Association's argument that there exists "ample evidence" to support the trial 
court's finding that the Dansies never offered to pay pro rata transportation costs is 
contrary to the record.7 The Association does not dispute thai Rodney Dansie had several 
conversations with the Association whereby he offered to pay costs associated with re-
connecting the water system and transporting the water to the Dansies, The Association 
consistently responded to Rodney Dansie's offers by unequivocally informing him that 
"absolutely, under no condition would I be reconnected to that water system ever." Tr. 
at 431:4-21 (Tyler); 120:19-122:2 & 187:6-189:21 (Rodney Dansie).8 
In addition, Richard Dansie testified that after the Association disconnected the 
water lines, he attended a meeting with the Association members whereby "I explained 
my situation, that I needed to be hooked on to the water. I needed water and I was 
willing to pay whatever it took, whatever the cost was to get me water. And I indicated 
that, you know, the lines were there, I had meters in place. And they said they couldn't 
In addition, the Association is mistaken that the Dansies failed to adequately marshal 
the evidence. As set forth in their Opening Brief, the Dansies cited to the trial testimony 
of Deborah Watson and Joe Totorica, the two witnesses who testified at trial that the 
Dansies did not offer to pay transportation costs. 
8
 In fact, Rodney Dansie testified that he had conversations with Ken Norton, Daryl 
Wooly, Craig Winger, Deborah Watson, Joe Totorica and Merrill Jensen, all directors of 
the Association, whereby Mr. Dansie offered to pay all the costs associated with 
transporting the water through the water system. The Association flatly rejected these 
numerous offers. Tr. at 187:6-189:25 (Rodney Dansie). 
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help me." Tr. at 478:16-21 (Richard Dansie). . When asked why he offered to pay 
whatever cost was necessary when the Well Lease provided for water at no charge, 
Richard Dansie explained, "I just needed water. . . . But I needed water then and so I was 
willing to pay whatever cost would be to get me some water so I didn't have to cancel 
parties." Tr. at 479: 20-24 (Richard Dansie). 
Finally, the Association's attempt to discredit the testimony of Steve Maxfield 
because he did not testify that Rodney Dansie offered to pay the Association for 
transportation costs is unavailing. Mr. Maxfield testified that he attended a meeting with 
Rodney Dansie at the Jordan Valley Water Conservancy District, which was also 
attended by Association members Deborah Watson and Joe Totorica, both of whom 
testified that the Dansies never made any offer to pay for the water. Tr. at 1202:7-
1203:3; 1218:1-16 (Watson) & 1368:18-1369:8 (Joe Totorica). During this meeting, Mr. 
Maxfield, an unbiased witness, testified that Rodney Dansie offered to pay the costs 
associated with hooking him back up to the water system. The Association's response 
was simple: "no way, period." Tr. at 564:1-565:19 (Maxfield). The Association's 
response would have certainly been the same regardless of whether Rodney Dansie 
offered to pay transportation costs. The evidence presented to the trial court therefore 
supports the conclusion that the Association never had any intention to transport water to 
the Dansies as required under the Well Lease, and likewise ignored or flatly refused all of 
the Dansie's multiple offers to pay to reconnect the water lines. The trial courfs finding 
that the Dansies made no such offer is therefore not supported by the record. 
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B. The Record Does Not Support The Trial Court's Decision Denying The 
Dansies' Claim For Damages, 
As explained in detail in the Dansies' Opening Brief, immediately upon assuming 
control of the Water System, the Association severed the Dansies' connection to that 
Water System and renounced any obligations under the Well Lease. At that time, the 
trial court had already held that the Well Lease was a valid and binding encumbrance on 
the Water System and that finding was still under appeal. As a result of the Association's 
actions in defiance of the trial court's ruling, the Dansies were forced to construct a 
temporary water system. Likewise, the Dansies were unable to develop and market their 
property, and suffered damage to their landscaping and fruit trees. The Association's 
argument that the Dansies' damages were "self-inflicted" is contrary to this evidence. 
First, the Dansies mitigated their damages by constructing a temporary water system. In 
fact, had the Dansies' not expended the effort and expense to construct this water system, 
their damages would certainly have increased exponentially. Second, it was certainly 
reasonably foreseeable at the time the Well Lease was executed that the Dansies would 
suffer damages should the Dansies be disconnected from the water system. Indeed, the 
purpose of the amendment to the Well Lease was to ensure that the Dansies had an 
adequate water supply. The Association's argument to the contrary is therefore without 
merit. 
Third, the Dansies have not changed their damages theories. Quite to the contrary, 
the Dansies have consistently maintained (1) that because the Well Lease requires the 
Association to provide up to 12 million gallons of water to the Dansies per year at no 
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cost, the Association breached the Well Lease by disconnecting and severing the water 
lines; and (2) that as a direct and proximate result of the Association's actions, the 
Dansies have suffered damages. This is the theory that was presented at trial. Although 
certain of the damage calculations may have changed as new evidence was brought to 
light, the theory has remained consistent. 
Finally, an alternative water supply was not available to the Dansies. Not only did 
the Association flatly refuse each of the Dansies' offer to pay to restore water service, but 
there existed no other source from which the Dansies could draw water. The Dansies 
could not physically divert water through Lot 9 because no line existed to distribute that 
water. The Dansie irrigation wells that were scattered across the Dansie property were at 
elevations where they could not provide service to the Dansie residences and no lines 
existed to provide such service even if the wells had the capacity to provide water. 
Tr. at 105:14-106:21, 115:1-16, 117:3-17, 120:19-122:4, 127:9-128:15 (Rodney Dansie). 
Rather, the Dansies could secure water service only when they constructed a new 
temporary water system. Indeed, the fact of the loss of water service to the Dansie 
property is evidenced by the Dansie complaints to the PSC regarding termination of 
service, contemporaneous entries in Rodney Dansies5 day timer (Trial Ex. 48), the 
expenses the Dansies incurred in constructing a temporary water system, and Richard 
Dansies' plea to the Association to restore water service to him, on any conditions. On 
the basis of this evidence, the trial court clearly erred in concluding that the Dansies did 
not suffer any damages. 
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V. THE ASSOCIATION IS LIABLE FOR THE DANSIES' ATTORNEYS' 
FEES. 
The Association mistakenly contends that it is not liable for the Dansies' attorneys 
fc^s, as set forth in the Well Lease, because it was not a successor or assign to the Well 
Lease. As explained above, however, this Court has already determined that the Well 
Lease is a valid and binding encumbrance on the Water System. The Well Lease 
provides that successors to Bagley are liable for attorneys' fees incurred in enforcing 
rights under the Well Lease. For twenty years now, the Association has received the 
benefits of the Well Lease, and is now Bagley's successor in the operation of the Water 
System. In fact, it was the Association that severed the Water System, depriving the 
Dansies of their rights to receive water under the Well Lease. Such action clearly 
demonstrates that the Association is liable for the Dansies' attorneys' fees incurred both 
at the trial court and on appeal. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
For the reasons set forth above, the Dansies respectfully request that this Court 
enter an Order affirming trial court's Order holding that Well Lease is neither 
unconscionable nor violative of any public policy, as well as the trial court's judgment of 
$16,334.99 in favor of the Dansies. In addition, the Dansies respectfully request that this 
Court likewise reverse the Order of the trial court, and holding that (1) the Dansies are 
entitled to the full benefit of the Well Lease, including, at no charge, up to twelve million 
gallons of water per year and up to fifty connections; (2) by severing the two water 
systems, the Association breached its obligations pursuant to the Well Lease, causing the 
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Dansies to sustain damages established at trial; and (3) the Dansies are entitled to an 
award of attorneys' fees and costs incurred both at the trial court and on appeal. 
si 
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